This paper uses observations from a panel data set of 35 chief executive officers (CEOs) from 29 not-for-profit hospitals in Connecticut over the period 1998 to 2006 to investigate the relationship between CEO performance and pay. Both economic and charity performance measures are specified in the empirical model. The multiple regression results reveal that not-for-profit hospital CEOs, at least in Connecticut, are driven at the margin to increase the occupancy rate of privately insured patients at the expense of uncompensated care and public-pay patients. This type of behavior on the part of not-for-profit hospital CEOs calls into question the desirability of allowing these hospitals a tax exemption on earned income, property, and purchases.
Not-for-Profit Hospital CEO Performance and Pay: Some Evidence from Connecticut This paper uses observations from a panel data set of 35 chief executive officers (CEOs) from 29 not-for-profit hospitals in Connecticut over the period 1998 to 2006 to investigate the relationship between CEO performance and pay. Both economic and charity performance measures are specified in the empirical model. The multiple regression results reveal that not-for-profit hospital CEOs, at least in Connecticut, are driven at the margin to increase the occupancy rate of privately insured patients at the expense of uncompensated care and public-pay patients. This type of behavior on the part of not-for-profit hospital CEOs calls into question the desirability of allowing these hospitals a tax exemption on earned income, property, and purchases.
Executive compensation has always captured a considerable amount of attention from the media and general public. The attention surrounding these compensation issues was particularly exacerbated last year as both legislators and the public seriously questioned the huge bonuses many major corporations paid their chief executive officers (CEOs) while being bailed out by the federal government. It has always been unclear, however, whether these concerns over CEO compensation have been driven by valid interests in economic efficiency, subjective notions of fairness, or a simple collective matter of envy. Regardless of the specific reason, we know that CEOs are paid much more than the typical worker and this gap continues to grow in both absolute and relative terms. Determining what should be done about this lopsided imbalance continues to pose a daunting problem for both society and regulators.
Similar to CEOs in general, corporate executives in the hospital services industry have not been shielded from societal attention regarding their pay (Martineau 2007; Waldman 2008; and Wangness 2009) . At first blush, this attention seems to be misplaced since most hospitals are organized on a notfor-profit basis because of their charitable mission. Not-for-profit hospitals are exempted from paying income, property, and sales taxes, with the understanding that this indirect government subsidy is being used to provide community benefits of various kinds such as uncompensated care, education, research, and outreach programs. In addition, Hansmann (1996) notes that not-forprofit organizations face a nondistribution constraint because legally they cannot directly distribute any excess earnings to those who make decisions within the organization, such as employees, managers, or board members.
Thus, not-for-profit status should mean hospital CEOs are compensated based upon their relative success at fulfilling the charitable mission of their organizations.
In contrast, however, economic theory suggests that a not-for-profit organization may pursue goals that maximize the personal utility of the CEO because, unlike a for-profit organization, no individual or residual claimant holds a financial stake in the company. Therefore no single person or outside institution faces a financial incentive to closely monitor the actions of the CEO. These individual goals of the CEO may conflict with cost minimization or societal goals, such as providing sufficient community benefits, and take form in discretionary expenditures on the so-called ''5Ps'' of pay, perquisites, power, patronage, and prestige (Santerre and Neun 1993) . Consequently, the CEO may be more interested in expanding the size of the organization, maximizing revenues to finance discretionary expenditures, or increasing the structural quality of the institution. Pursuing individual goals may be relatively unconstrained because the CEO often plays a pivotal role in the selection of various board members. The implication of this property rights model is that the compensation of hospital CEOs may be unrelated to their onthe-job performance, particularly with respect to satisfying the charitable mission of the organization.
Given these two conflicting views regarding the relationship between performance and pay in a not-for-profit hospital setting, this paper empirically examines how various measures of performance affected the compensation of 35 CEOs from 29 not-for-profit hospitals in Connecticut during the period 1998 to 2006. The empirical results suggest that the typical not-for-profit hospital CEO faces an incentive to increase the occupancy rate of privately insured patients and possesses little incentive to provide additional charity care at the margin.
The next section of this paper reviews the literature on what is currently known about the determinants of CEO compensation in the hospital services industry. The empirical model, sample, and data are discussed in the third section, while the fourth section pre-sents the empirical findings. A summary is offered in the last section.
Previous Studies on Hospital CEO Performance and Pay
Only seven studies to date have empirically analyzed the factors influencing hospital CEO pay. Among the first, Pink and Leatt (1991) studied the determinants of hospital CEO pay using a cross-section sample of 213 not-for-profit hospitals in Ontario, Canada. Pink and Leatt concluded that not-for-profit hospital management compensation is primarily determined by hospital size and teaching status, and reflects only a weak correspondence to hospital financial performance. Employing a cross-section sample of 69 hospitals in Texas and fiscal year 1990 data, Santerre and Thomas (1993) investigated whether the fixed and total compensation of for-profit, not-for-profit, and public hospital CEOs differ. After controlling for CEO personal characteristics such as education, experience, and gender, and hospital characteristics including organizational size, teaching status, and chain membership, these authors found no difference in pay for CEOs working in those three types of hospitals. As in these first two studies, Preyra and Pink (2001) also adopted a cross-sectional approach but compared hospital CEO pay to that of industrial CEOs in Ontario, Canada. They found that Ontario's hospital CEOs were being rewarded for financial performance. Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) , with a cross-sectional national data set for 1992, studied the influence of ownership form (e.g., for-profit or not-for-profit status) on the level and mixture of compensation for several types of hospital officers. Of interest to this paper, these researchers found that job complexity, but not form of ownership, has a statistically independent impact on the total compensation of the typical hospital CEO. 1 Employing a sample of 687 hospital-year observations for the period 1993-1995 from 420 different not-for-profit hospitals, Brickley and Van Horn (2002) examined whether organizational size, financial performance, and charitable performance are related to changes in the cash compensation of hospital CEOs. They employed a contemporaneous measure of return on assets to measure financial performance and revenues per patient day, nurses on duty per patient, and program service (rather than administrative) expenditures to capture charitable performance. The authors noted that the latter three variables are crude proxies for altruism or charity. Brickley and Van Horn found that financial, but not charitable, performance was statistically related to a greater percentage change in not-for-profit hospital CEO pay.
In yet another study, Bertrand, Hallock, and Arnould (2005) , using a sample of 4,237 hospital-year observations over the period 1992 to 1996, analyzed the impact of financial, charity, and quality performance on the total compensation of not-for-profit hospital CEOs. Return on assets and profit margin (net income/total revenues) were used to capture financial performance, whereas program expense services per patient day, nursing and doctors per patient day, and fraction of Medicaid patients were used as charity and quality performance measures in the empirical test. Some specifications included hospital fixed effects and controls were made for city size, Medicare-adjusted inpatient days, organizational size, and indicator variables for various facilities such as neonatal intensive care units. From the empirical findings, the authors concluded that hospital CEO pay was not tightly tied to economic performance in not-for-profit hospitals although the relationship did strengthen with higher rates of health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration. In addition, Bertrand, Hallock, and Arnould found only program service expenditures per patient day to have a direct impact on hospital CEO pay when all of the charity/quality performance measures were jointly specified and fixed hospital effects were included in the empirical test. Finally, Reiter et al. (2009) examined the relationship between financial performance and pay using a panel data set of 132 CEOs from 92 hospitals between 1999 and 2006 in Ontario, Canada. After controlling for hospital size, time trends, and CEO fixed effects, they found that financial performance was unrelated to total CEO salary.
Four conclusions can be drawn from this literature review. First, the studies by Santerre and Thomas (1993) and Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) found little difference in the total compensation of nonprofit and forprofit hospital CEOs. If it were not for the fact that both Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) and Ballou and Weisbrod (2003) found that various organizational forms used incentive contracts differently, these two studies taken alone would imply that for-profit and notfor-profit hospital CEOs might be driven by similar objectives, whatever they might be. Alternatively, it might be that hospitals of any type purchase executive skills in common markets at competitive wages. In any case, we may not want to draw any strong conclusions about causation from these three studies because they all were cross-sectional in nature.
Second, the literature review suggests the relationship between financial performance and the total compensation of not-for-profit hospital CEOs is questionable at best. While Brickley and Van Horn (2002) and Preyra and Pink (2001) found that financial performance matters, Pink and Leatt (1991) , Bertrand, Hallock, and Arnould (2005) , and Reiter et al. (2009) did not find a significant relationship. Moreover, the latter two studies adopted a fixed-effects model to account for unobservable factors that might otherwise bias the results. 2 Third, the relationship between charitable performance and the compensation of nonprofit hospital CEOs is similarly mixed. The mixed results may reflect the questionable nature of the charity performance indicators used by researchers.
Finally, we can conclude from the literature review that further studies are clearly needed to address the relationship between the effect of financial and charitable performance on not-for-profit hospital CEO pay. Previous studies have been largely crosssectional in nature or have depended on weak proxies for charitable performance. This study contributes to the empirical literature on not-for-profit hospital CEO pay by using a panel data set of 35 CEOs from 29 not-forprofit hospitals in Connecticut over the period 1998 to 2006. The data source allows us to measure three indicators of charitable performance: uncompensated care as a percentage of operating revenues and the percentages of revenues received from both the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Previous studies were unable to control for the former measure, which is often used to capture hospital charity (e.g., Morrisey, Wedig, and Hassan 1996 or Nicholson et al. 2000) .
Conceptual Model
Based upon the previous literature, our conceptual model of hospital CEO compensation, COMP, adopts the following general form:
The previous literature clearly shows that hospital CEOs are paid more when they manage larger facilities, positions that carry greater responsibilities. Thus, we expect that board directors reward hospital CEOs more handsomely when they manage larger organizations. In contrast to that certain relationship, the empirical literature has been mostly mixed on the relationship between the two performance measures and hospital CEO compensation, as mentioned previously. The mixed results may reflect the theoretical ambiguity regarding how both economic and charitable performance might jointly affect hospital CEO pay. Certainly, better economic performance, through improved efficiency, means that a hospital possesses greater ability to afford more charitable care and other types of community benefits (Hsieh, Clement, and Bazzoli 2010) . In practice, however, economic goals and charitable mission may clash with one another. For example, using more hospital revenues to finance uncompensated care or other types of community benefits means a lower profit margin and less discretionary funds available for purchasing new therapeutic or diagnostic equipment, expanding existing services, or introducing new services. If the two goals do conflict, their net effect on CEO pay depends on the preference weights the board of directors assigns to each of the individual performance measures.
In addition, some theoretical models of hospital behavior with respect to patient selection add to this ambiguity. For example, Folland, Goodman, and Stano (2007) considered a model where a hospital with market power simultaneously operates in the private and public submarkets of a hospital services marketplace. Their model assumes that public patients are exogenously assigned to the hospital. The researchers further assume that hospital decision makers set the private price to maximize profits, but simply accept the government-administered price and initially earn a break-even level of profits in the public-sector submarket. Given a lower administered price (or more lower reimbursed patients, hereafter referred to as ''charitable care'' patients), the Folland, Goodman, and Stano model predicts that the hospital will not engage in cost-shifting behavior because the private price has already been set at the profit-maximizing level. However, overall hospital profits decline in response to the charitable care patients, so the Folland, Goodman, and Stano model predicts that CEO pay declines with potentially more charitable care because the hospital is assumed to be driven by maximum profits.
Based on Morrisey (2003) , Santerre (2005) recast the Folland, Goodman, and Stano model by supposing that hospital decision makers initially operate with some unexploited market power in the private submarket because, instead of profits, they maximize the number of patients subject to a break-even level of profits. In fact, maximizing the number of patients subject to a break-even level of profits may relate better to a not-forprofit mission. Initially, Santerre assumed that a normal profit is earned in both the private and public submarkets, and like Folland, Goodman, and Stano, the number of public patients is exogenously assigned to the hospital. The Santerre model predicts that if the hospital faces a lower administered price or additional charitable care patients such that a loss develops in the public submarket, the hospital will react by cost shifting and implicitly taxing consumers in the private submarket to make up for the loss. Consequently, hospital profits potentially remain the same (a normal level), but private patients are crowded out by the lower administered price or increased number of charitable care patients. Because profit maximization is not the main goal and the number of patients may increase overall, it follows that higher CEO pay may be associated with an increased number of charitable care patients in this model.
Finally, the dual-market model of Sloan, Mitchell, and Cromwell (1978) or Scanlon (1980) supposes that a health care organization faces two separate demand curves for private and public patients and then chooses between the two types of patients to maximize overall profits. Note that public-pay patients are not exogenously assigned to the hospital in this model. Because marginal revenues from private-pay patients initially lie above public-pay marginal revenues, the hospital first fills the empty beds with private-pay patients. Any remaining empty beds are then filled with public-pay patients as long as the (flat) marginal government revenues are greater than marginal costs. This dual-market model predicts that a lower administered price results in fewer public-pay patients and more private-pay patients. Given the main focus is on maximum profits, this model predicts that an increased amount of charitable care patients is associated with lower hospital CEO pay. When considered together, these three models point to the theoretically ambiguous relationship between the two performance measures and hospital CEO pay. The exact relationship depends on the myriad goals that not-for-profit hospitals may face and the preference weights assigned to those goals by board members. Thus, an empirical investigation is necessary to sort out the precise relationship. To that, we now turn our attention.
Variables, Empirical Model, Sample, and Data

Variables
In the following empirical analysis, organizational size is measured by the number of staffed beds. Not only have staffed beds been used by most empirical studies, but unlike total revenues or assets, use of staffed beds has the added attraction that it does not involve a dollar amount, which may not be comparable-even across areas of a state-because of cost of living differences. Moreover, hospitals are often judged in terms of their bed-size capacity by insurers, the public, and policymakers. Nonetheless, beds may differ in terms of the physical and human capital devoted to them in different hospitals. 4 As a result, we also include the total number of major procedures performed each year at each hospital. These major procedures include computerized axial tomography (CAT) scans, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans, linear accelerator procedures, and cardiac catheterization procedures, and are specified on a per full-time employee (FTE) basis in the regression analysis. A positive coefficient estimate is expected on this variable given the greater responsibility of running a hospital with more varied and complex services.
Economic performance is captured by both the hospital's operating margin, or operating income divided by total operating revenues, and the annual occupancy rate of the hospital. The first economic performance measure requires no justification. With respect to the occupancy rate, producing closer to capacity is necessary to minimize the average costs of delivery of medical care because fixed costs make up about 84% of a hospital's total operating budget (Roberts et al. 1999 ). In addition, one empty bed can cost a hospital in excess of $40,000 per year in maintenance, staffing, and depreciation charges (Cary 1998).
As already noted, we measure charitable performance by three variables: expenditures on uncompensated care as a fraction of operating revenues, and the shares of operating revenues from the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Expenditures on uncompensated care include charity care costs and bad debts. As mentioned previously, numerous studies have specified uncompensated care costs as a measure of charity when determining empirically whether not-for-profit hospitals pay their way in terms of providing community benefits in excess of the tax subsidy they receive from local, state, and federal governments. The second and third measures of charitable giving reflect that the Medicare and Medicaid programs reimburse at rates that are often below the actual costs of delivering many hospital services. 5
Model
For estimation purposes, we assume the following specific form:
with SBEDS, SVCPE, OPM, OCC, UCC, SMCARE, and SMCAID representing the number of staffed beds, services per FTE employee, operating profit margin, occupancy rate, uncompensated care costs as a fraction of operating revenues, and share of operating revenues from Medicare and Medicaid, respectively. With total compensation and number of staffed beds expressed as logarithms, all of the variables in equation 2 are similarly specified in ratio form. Notice that all of the independent variables are lagged one year to reflect that prior year performance likely influences current pay levels. The lagged nature of the independent variables also reduces the likelihood of reverse causality or that pay affects performance.
Sample and Data
The necessary ( 
Multiple Regression Results
Multiple regression results are reported in Table 2 for three different time periods. The three time periods allow for an increasing percentage of possible observations: 74%, 79%, and 83%, respectively. As expected, and consistent with previous studies, all three regression models show that CEO compensation is directly related to larger organizational size. The coefficient estimate on the logarithm of staffed beds can be interpreted as an elasticity measure. Thus, a 10% increase in the number of beds results in a 5% to 6% increase in CEO pay, all else equal. Also, as anticipated, we find a positive coefficient estimate on the number of services per employee. Indeed, a calculated elasticity implies that a 10% increase in the number of services relative to employees is associated with a 1.4% increase in CEO pay. 8 The estimated coefficients on the two economic performance measures are positive for all six cases and statistically significant for four of them. Consequently, the empirical results suggest that hospital CEOs typically are rewarded with additional pay when their hospitals improve financially. The calculated elasticity suggests that the relationship between operating profit margin and total compensation is quantitatively tiny, however. Using the coefficient estimate of .008, a doubling of the profit rate increases the CEO's pay by only .03%, or approximately $15,000 based on a mean salary of $523,469, assuming all other factors remain constant. The relationship between the occupancy rate and CEO pay is quantitatively more important, however. Using the estimated coefficient on this variable in column 2, the calculated elasticity implies that CEO pay increases by 4% if the occupancy rate rises by an additional 10%. The implications of these findings are interesting because together they may suggest that expanding the number of staffed beds and the occupancy of those beds take precedence over profitability, as if the hospital is maximizing revenues. 9 Interestingly, the estimated coefficients on the three charity performance indicators are consistently negative for all nine cases and statistically significant for six of the results. The implication is that hospital CEOs are paid less if they provide more charity care at the margin. Moreover, CEO pay appears to be much more strongly related to the percentage of patients with Medicare or Medicaid coverage as opposed to the percentage uninsured. For instance, using the results in the third column of Table 2 , a 10% increase in Medicare's share of hospital revenues lowers CEO pay by 11% and a similar percentage increase in Medicaid's share reduces CEO pay by roughly 6.3%. Consequently, if not-for-profit hospital CEOs in Connecticut are motivated by their pay, the results suggest that they face an incentive to increase the hospital's size and occupancy rate by encouraging the admission of more privately insured patients at the margin. In contrast, providing more uncompensated care and admitting an additional public-pay patient do not lead to greater compensation for hospital CEOs. It may be the case that the CEO and board of directors feel that the hospital best fulfills its mission by growing and expanding. For example, a brand new hospital wing filled to capacity with privately insured patients would likely take precedence over a free clinic serving mostly nonpaying or public-pay patients. All in all, the empirical findings appear to support the dual-market model where hospital administrators practice price discrimination by favoring the admission of higherpaying patients relative to lower-paying patients. 10
Conclusion
Previous studies on the determinants of hospital CEO pay have been mixed at best with regard to whether not-for-profit hospital CEOs are driven more by financial or charitable performance. Using uncompensated care costs and the public sector's share of hospital revenues as measures of charitable performance, this study finds that not-forprofit hospital CEOs, at least in Connecticut, are motivated by pay incentives to increase the occupancy of privately insured patients at the expense of uncompensated care and public-pay patients. In short, the empirical results suggest that economic performance takes precedence over charitable performance at the margin.
The only curious finding is that hospital CEO pay is more strongly and inversely related to a greater percentage of revenues from public payers than the fraction of revenues paid out in the form of uncompensated care. However, that stronger relationship might reflect that the loss from public-pay patients typically exceeds the costs paid out for uncompensated care. In 2007, the typical community hospital paymentto-cost ratios were 87.9% and 90.6% for Medicaid and Medicare patients, respectively. 11 For that same year, uncompensated care expenses by hospitals as a percentage of expenses averaged 5.8% (AHA 2009). Notice the loss percentages outweigh the paid-out percentage. This curious finding may also reflect the relatively low number of uninsured individuals in Connecticut.
This incentive facing not-for-profit hospital CEOs calls into question the tax-exempt nature of their organizations. Not-for-profit hospitals are expected to use the implicit government subsidy from the tax exemption to help finance indigent care and provide other types of community benefits. But according to the findings here, not-for-profit hospital CEOs may face the opposite incentive to cherry-pick additional privately insured patients and ignore community benefits at the margin. Perhaps it is time to follow Bloche's (2006) notion and explicitly tie the tax exemption to the amount of charity or community benefits provided by a not-forprofit hospital above and beyond some expected level, such as the community benefits provided by an otherwise comparable forprofit hospital.
Of course, our results for not-for-profit CEOs in Connecticut may not hold for hospital CEOs in other areas of the country. In particular, although Connecticut is a fairly compact state and consumers/patients sometimes choose services at hospitals outside their immediate area, the hospitals in our sample are not randomly assigned to their locations. Thus, despite the fixed-effects approach, the location of the hospital may bias the results in one way or another. We invite others to pursue this fruitful line of inquiry by using larger data sets and other measures of the potential community benefits offered by not-for-profit hospitals, such as education, research, and outreach activities. At the very least, this study offers a useful template for undertaking a more ambitious study. It also provides policymakers with some preliminary information suggesting that not-for-profit hospitals may not be behaving in accordance with the ''spirit'' and intent of their tax-exempt status.
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1 Ballou and Weisbrod (2003) extended the study of Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) by analyzing the importance placed on different components of total compensation such as the salaries and bonuses among different types of not-for-profit hospitals. However, they did not directly examine the impact of financial and charitable performance on hospital CEO pay, which is the topic of this paper. 2 However, Reiter et al. (2009) did not specify measures of charitable performance. 3 Ideally, we would like to include the personal characteristics of the CEO, such as professional training and years of experience, but these data were unavailable to us as they were for most other researchers except Santerre and Thomas (1993) . Santerre and Thomas, however, did not include performance variables in their empirical model. Hogan and McPheters (1980) point out that marginal productivity theory suggests personal characteristics matter less in the presence of performance variables. 4 We thank a referee for pointing this out. 5 See Friedman et al. (2004) or http://facts.kff. org/chart.aspx?ch5179 (accessed April 29, 2010). 6 Hospitals are required to report the compensation of the 10 highest paid employees. Therefore, it may be the case that some observations for CEO compensation are missing because the hospital CEO is not among the highest paid. As a result, we also employed Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure to estimate equation 2. In the first step, we estimated the probability that the data for CEO compensation are available as a function of the right-hand side variable in equation 2 along with the highest compensation paid to any employee at each hospital. As expected, the estimated coefficient on maximum compensation is negative and statistically significant in the first step, suggesting that the CEO's compensation is less likely to be reported when other employees are more highly paid. In the second stage, the inverse Mills ratio is calculated from the first-stage results and included as an additional independent variable in the estimation of CEO pay. The estimated coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio turns out to be negative and statistically significant, reflecting that missing values may involve some selectivity bias. However, the general findings of this study remain the same. These results will be provided by the authors on request. 7 Thirty-one hospitals currently exist in Connecticut. One hospital, the John Dempsey Center, is a public hospital and part of the University of Connecticut and therefore not used in the empirical analysis. Another hospital converted to for-profit status in 2002 and had interim CEOs during most of the 1997 to 2001 period, so that hospital also was not used in the empirical analysis. 8 Given the semi-log specification with respect to six of the independent variables, elasticity can be calculated by multiplying b, the estimated coefficient, by X, the mean value of a particular independent variable. 9 Of course, we really want economic profitability, but must use an accounting profit rate as a surrogate. 10 Only 6.6% of the 290 hospital observations are associated with a CEO leaving the position. As a result, not enough variation exists to examine how the various factors influence the CEO turnover rate. 11 See http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?ch5179 (accessed April 29, 2010).
